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Abstract 
 
Most sub-fields of research in political science are today at an intellectual plateau well 
short of general theory.  Many have been at that plateau since about 1980.  Several reasons might 
account for this situation, including the challenge of constructing general theory.  I argue, 
however, that some of our must common educational and research practices also retard 
theoretical progress.  I describe those practices and their unfortunate consequences, but also 
explicate a series of research strategies that would help advance our theoretical work.  As a 
foundation for the preceding arguments, I characterize the theory building ambitions of the 
discipline, our progress toward general theory, and how advances toward such theory can be 
mapped for any science.   
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“In Search of General Theory” 
I argue, and explicate the argument, that most of the scientific study of political science is 
at a plateau of advancement well short of the goal of general theory.  Further, the fields in which 
I read for teaching or research appear to have been at that plateau since about 1980.  Some 
research areas are more advanced than this, but very many fields in our discipline appear to be at 
this same plateau.  Doubtless, we know much more today factually and by way of exploratory 
and some theory building research than we did thirty years ago.  But that does not mean our 
theory has necessarily progressed much in that interval. This state of intellectual affairs is surely 
attributable in part to the difficulty of constructing a general theoretic formulation of some 
persuasiveness.  Yet I also argue that we are ourselves responsible in part for this situation 
because of how we often educate young scholars in the state of received knowledge, because 
many of our common research practices do not contribute to the search for general theory, and 
because we neglect ones that could be more profitable.   
I criticize much current research practice in political science in support of the preceding 
argument.  The reach of these criticisms is broad.  Indeed, my own work has suffered from most 
of the shortcomings identified here. The primary goal of this paper, however, is to suggest 
educational practices and research routines that might advance our efforts to create general 
knowledge.  If the criticisms here have wide applicability, the ambition of this paper is that the 
solutions for overcoming them will be equally widely embraced. 
  Three fundamental topics must be considered, however, before discussing these possible 
solutions.  Thus I first characterize the theory building ambitions of the discipline, our progress 
toward general theory, and how advances toward that goal can be mapped in general terms for 
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any science.  When enough of those fundamental topics has been explicated, I also offer a 
definition of general theory. 
 
Theory Building Ambitions in Political Science 
 One could simply take it as a universally recognized assumption that theory building is a 
primary goal of our discipline.  Our leading journals commonly cite theoretical contributions as a 
major criterion for publication. Our textbook expositions of “how to do” political science, for 
both undergraduate and graduate students, make that assumption.  It is a key part of graduate 
education in most doctoral programs.  And the intention to advance theory is virtually a ritual 
observation in most scholarly papers in political science.  Yet deliberate consideration in print of 
the character or promise for this ambition is rare.  Perhaps the latter circumstance can be 
explained, for good or ill, by Kuhn’s (1996, 47; see also Northrop 1949, 389-391) observation: 
“Though many scientists talk easily and well about the particular individual hypotheses 
that underlie a concrete piece of current research, they are little better than laymen at 
characterizing the established bases of their field, its legitimate problems and methods.  If 
they have learned such abstractions at all, they show it mainly through their ability to do 
successful research.  That ability can, however, be understood without recourse to 
hypothetical rules of the game.” 
  Some comments on the character of our theoretical ambitions will be useful as a 
foundation for much that follows in this essay.  Yet, absent much explicit discussion of this 
topic, one must infer the disposition of the profession about it largely from what is implicit in its 
educational and research materials.  Principally on the latter basis and from wide discussion with 
scholarly peers I conclude that three assumptions about our theory building ambitions are 
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widespread, even if they are often held sub-consciously.  The first is that our highest ambition is, 
indeed, to create general theory about real-world political phenomena.  This first assumption and 
the “philosophy of science” associated with it are still today well characterized by the 
fundamental beliefs that David Easton (1965, 6-8) articulated for the behavioral movement in A 
Framework for Political Analysis:   
(1) “There are discoverable uniformities in political behavior.  These can be expressed in 
generalizations or theories with explanatory or predictive value.” 
(2) “The validity of such generalizations must be testable…,” 
(3) “Means for acquiring and interpreting data cannot be taken for granted.  They are problematic 
and need to be examined self-consciously, refined, and validated…, 
(4) “Precision in the recording of data and the statement of findings requires measurement and 
quantification, not for their own sake, but only where possible, relevant, and meaningful in the 
light of other objectives,” 
(5) “Research ought to be systematic, that is, theory and research are to be seen as closely 
intertwined parts of a coherent and orderly body of knowledge,” 
(6) “Because the social sciences deal with the whole human situation, political research can 
ignore the findings of other disciplines only at the peril of weakening the validity and 
undermining the generality of its own results.” 
 The preceding list of beliefs and objectives should sound especially familiar to many 
contemporary political scientists because items 1 through 5 of that list are all essential points in 
King, Keohane, and Verba’s (1994, 3-33) initial chapter on “The Science in Political Science.”  
And observing the commonalities between Easton’s and King, Keohane, and Verba’s work is no 
discredit to either.  It testifies, instead, to the enduring centrality of these objectives. 
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 The second common assumption is that most of our scientific work is guided by a 
“neopositivist” philosophy of science that, as Maxim (1999, 10) best observes, “retains the 
crucial strengths of the traditional scientific method” of logical positivism but without the 
“simplistic assumptions” also associated with the latter perspective (see also Ostrom 1982).  This 
assumption also means that many political scientists envision that an advanced theory would be 
stated in something like “hypothetico-deductive” form (Maxim 1999, 21-22).  This second 
assumption is rarely stated forthrightly but is obvious in much work with theoretical ambitions if 
one “reads between the lines” of what is said forthrightly.  At the same time the discipline does 
not hew to any particular formulaic notion of how covering law theory is to be explicated, a 
subject to which I return later. 
 The third commonly held assumption is that political science shares with the physical 
sciences the same basic research philosophy, general research practices, and optimism for 
explaining the portion of the natural world we study.  Explicit recognition of this third point is 
rare but is made in contemporary times and in differing ways by Alt (2009, 146-147), Hill 
(2004), and Rogowski (1995).   King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 7-9) implicitly endorse this 
point in their list of the essential characteristics of social science research.  Kaplan (1964, 30-31) 
and Deutsch (1986, 5-8) asserted this second assumption, too, and much earlier, especially with 
respect to the research methodologies we share with the physical sciences. 
 While these assumptions are commonplace among working scientists in our discipline, 
they have long been contested by some philosophers and even by some scientifically minded 
political scientists.  The belief that one can account for phenomena in the political world with 
research based on the same assumptions and methods used by physical scientists has been 
especially criticized on logical and normative grounds.  For good summaries of some of the 
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major lines of criticism here, see Almond (1998) and Diesing (1991). To my taste, however, 
Easton (1953, 3-36) and Nagel (1961, 447-502) long ago debunked the logic behind most such 
criticisms.   
Other critics see in the preceding assumption as well an unwarranted elevation of some 
research methods over others (e.g., Schram 2005).   Yet at the heart of some of these critiques are 
also often different opinions from those of many scientists about what scholars wish to explain 
about the political world.  Whatever the philosophical or other merits of these criticisms, the 
community of working scientists appears at least implicitly to have accepted Kaplan’s (1964, 3-
33) argument that there is a defensible “logic in use” of our scientific assumptions and methods 
regardless of how other communities of scholars view them.  Or one might conclude with 
Einstein (1954b, 19) that most working political scientists put aside unhelpful characterizations 
of science by “the philosophy police.” 
 There is also notable criticism of some of our conventional research methodologies and 
practices from the statistical community and from statistically sophisticated political scientists 
(see, especially, Achen 2002, Brady 2008, and Freedman 2010).  The latter criticism initially 
focuses on the methodologies with which we collect and analyze the non-experimental data that 
is employed in most of our research.  Ultimately, however, such criticism concerns the nature of 
the hypotheses and theory about the natural world that can feasibly be tested with non-
experimental evidence.  Thus it raises doubts about all three of the common assumptions for our 
theory building ambitions.  It is presently unclear, however, how the discipline will respond to 
these concerns.  My reaction to many of these criticisms is that they depend too heavily on 
philosophical and statistical logics and give insufficient attention to how optimal scientific 
research practices can help overcome the challenges of working with non-experimental evidence.  
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Marini and Singer (1988) offer an especially good sketch of such optimal scientific practices and 
rationales for them, yet portions of that sketch appear in methodological discussions by political 
scientists, as well. 
There is also lively discussion within the discipline about what research practices can 
most efficaciously lead to scientific theory, especially with regard to the separate merits of 
qualitative and quantitative methods (e.g., King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Brady and Collier 
2004).  This body of methodological work, in contrast to the preceding one, has attracted a wide 
audience and, thus, appears to be potentially highly productive.  It has the prospects of improving 
scholarship that relies on many different kinds of research methods, encouraging especially 
efficacious multi-method research, and bridging long-standing divides between scholars from 
different methodological schools.  Yet the test for this line of discussion will be how deeply its 
contributions sink into the discipline. 
 
What General Theory Is 
 Consider a few prominent theories in our discipline – all of which have been especially 
influential in their respective sub-fields – that will be discussed in more detail later in this essay.  
Depending on whether one would credit Milbrath (1965, 110-141) or Verba and Nie (1972, 125-
137) for the formulation, at least by 1972 research on mass political participation in the United 
States had accepted the inductively derived socio-economic status (SES) theory as the “standard 
model” or theory to account for such behavior.   A voluminous body of subsequent scholarship 
has appeared on political participation and related topics that employs this standard model as its 
theoretical foundation or that attempts to advance the model itself.    Yet the SES model has also 
bedeviled scholars in this field, because it has very high explanatory power but does not clearly 
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identify underlying causal mechanisms (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995, 280-282). We 
obviously know today much more about the determinants of voting and other forms of political 
participation by the mass public, but I conclude that we are no closer to a general theory than we 
were in 1972 (based on criteria that are explicated below). 
 The study of the U.S. Congress has profited by the creation of several competing theories 
of lawmaking, including Cox and McCubbin’s (2005) procedural cartel theory and Krehbiel’s 
(1998) theory of pivotal politics.   Another such theory, for conditional party government (CPG), 
arose out of inductive research by Cooper and Brady (1981), Brady, Cooper, and Hurley (1979), 
Rohde (1991), and Aldrich (2011).  CPG theory has especially attracted many adherents who 
have contributed to its development.  But, while “conditional party government” was first 
identified as a goal of reformers in the U.S. Congress with notable theoretical implications by 
Rohde (1991, 31-34) some twenty years ago, the theory surrounding that concept has not been 
systematically articulated in the ways that science conventionally expects for a general theory.    
The study of national political leaders and national policymaking more generally has led 
to the creation of a range of theoretical paradigms.  One of the most notable is the “selectorate 
theory” advanced by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003), that appears to 
have been derived by a combination of inductive and deductive reasoning.  This intellectually 
ambitious, highly abstract theory offers an explanation for how the mechanisms by which 
national political leaders are chosen produce incentives for the kinds of domestic and 
international policies they will pursue.  This is the most sophisticated of the three theoretical 
formulations I use as examples – at least with respect to how the theory has been formulated, but 
it does not appear ready either to be designated an unqualified general theory.  
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Why are these and many other theoretical formulations in political science deficient as 
general accounts of relevant behavior?  Consider what we mean when we use the term general 
theory and the degree to which we have crafted such intellectual products.   There is broad 
agreement in the scientific literature, first, that general theory should be stated in a relatively 
complete, descriptive way.  Yet there is no consensus in the scientific or the philosophy of 
science literature on the optimal form or nomenclature for stating such a theory (see, as some 
example expositions, Blalock, 1969, 1-12; Gibbs 1994, 279-364; Hempel 1965, 331-354).   Since 
the articulation of advanced theory can be seen as a creative step, some discretion about form 
seems appropriate.   In my own work on such a formalization, that is briefly discussed below, 
however, I explicate explicitly: 
1) Assumptions about the substantive phenomena under examination that are not explicitly 
tested, 
2)  Constitutive definitions (that is, verbal definitions) of key concepts, 
3) Measurement assumptions either about how optimal operational definitions of the key 
concepts should be developed or about the character of the most valid and reliable data 
that should be employed in measurement, 
4) Axioms about broadly conceived relations among concepts that are assumed but not 
explicitly tested, 
5) Testable propositions derived from the more general axioms that provide a basis for tests 
of verification of the theory. 
Further, there are criteria by which to evaluate theories individually and comparatively.  
Conventional scientific values that are widely if not universally endorsed in our discipline 
suggest that an optimal theory would: (1) incorporate explanatory factors that are commonly 
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suggested by existing research (a criterion I will call theoretical relevance), (2) adopt a 
nomothetic model of explanation (identifying the substantively most important causes and 
ignoring minor causes), (3) exhibit parsimony, and (4) have high explanatory power (e.g., Leege 
and Francis 1974. 33-35; Przeworski and Teune 1970, 17-23; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 
1995, 273-280).  These criteria for scientific theory are frequently acknowledged, but some of 
them have at times been controversial or literally ignored.  A brief digression on the latter matter 
is worthwhile, too, before considering the degree to which we have theories that meet these 
criteria.   
King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 20), first, doubt the value of the parsimony criterion 
and observe that a parsimonious theory might only be appropriate when we correctly judge the 
relevant real-world behavior to be simple.1  They note, too, that parsimony is not a priority in 
some other sciences which, evidently, judge the real-world phenomena they study not to be 
“simple.”  Yet parsimony is a worthy goal for theory in all sciences.  We cannot know in 
advance how likely we are to achieve parsimonious theories about particular phenomena.  Nor 
can we know in advance whether those phenomena are truly simple or complex or whether a 
creative scientist might one day envision a parsimonious account for what were once thought to 
be complex phenomena.  Indeed, are not the complexity or the simplicity of real-world 
phenomena in large part mental constructions?  Why, then, should we temper our theory building 
ambition by assuming a priori that some subjects are too complex to be characterized 
                                                 
1Yet King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 29) advance a criterion for theory testing for “explaining 
as much as possible with as little as possible,” which reads like an alternative call for parsimony. 
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parsimoniously?  The ultimate test, of course, is the theory we can create, and we should pursue 
that challenge ambitiously instead of timidly. 
A parsimonious theory could also be valued for its elegance (e.g., Kaplan 1964, 318-319; 
Leege and Francis 1974, 35), although the importance of elegance could also be under-
appreciated.  While many scientists would endorse Polanyi’s (1958, 145) characterization that 
“the intellectual beauty of a theory is a token of its contact with reality,” others might think this 
criterion lame or foolish.  But many scientists are inspired by the belief that the real world is 
governed by elegant laws that it is the goal of science to uncover.  Thus elegance is widely 
espoused as a criterion for theory, and here too ambition instead of timidity should be our goal. 
As a final example in this digression, explanatory power is sometimes ignored in what 
claims to be theory building research.  Much scholarship intended to create middle-range theory 
seems to accept low explanatory power as the price of the search for eventually more complete 
theoretical formulations.   At least one could hope that this is the reason for ignoring the 
explanatory power in such research.  Yet considerable work that tests propositions that prove to 
have little explanatory power often ignores that fact and whatever implications it might have for 
the scholar’s longer term theoretical goal. But advanced theory should be evaluated for its ability 
to account for relevant real-world phenomena.  As Einstein (1954a, 271) said, “all knowledge of 
reality starts with experience and ends in it.”  He meant specifically, too, that scientific theory is 
inspired by observation of the natural world but is not complete until it is verified with empirical 
tests of its implications about that same natural world.   
Explanatory power is important in a second way, as well.  It is routinely observed, 
although perhaps too superficially and even incorrectly for some instances, that many theories 
might account for the same set of empirical observations.  But a widely endorsed criterion for 
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evaluating competing theories is to ask which of them accounts for more observable phenomena.  
That is, we ask which has greater explanatory power.  Thus at some point we must take this 
criterion seriously if we are to discriminate among competing theories. 
One could also conclude that any specific general theory may have to seek a balance 
among the criteria of theoretical relevance, nomothetic explanation, parsimony, elegance, and 
explanatory power, yet I suspect that theoretical relevance would be the most important criterion. 
The preceding, conventionally cited criteria for advanced theory point to but do not fully 
provide a definition for the term general theory as it is most commonly used in science.  Based 
on the consideration of many examples from the history of science one might define a general 
theory as:  a well articulated (e.g., stated) theoretical formulation that offers an explanation of 
some real world phenomena of central importance to a given scientific discipline, that meets the 
four criteria for a good theory discussed above to some significant degree even if some are better 
achieved than others, and that the majority of scholars in the relevant sub-field acknowledge to 
be the most comprehensive and satisfactory explanation for the subject matter addressed by the 
theory.  The last criterion about acceptance over its competing theoretical rivals is not listed in 
conventional methodological works on advanced theory but is widely acknowledged in more 
general accounts. 
At least in many physical sciences it is also apparent that both the instrumental and the 
esthetic value of general theories are widely appreciated.  High explanatory power most indicates 
instrumental value.  Parsimony, elegance, and reliance on nomothetic explanation imply 
dimensions of esthetic value.  It is curious that the esthetic value of theories in the physical 
sciences is often acknowledged by working scholars, yet I cannot cite a single such observation 
about theory from the social sciences. 
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Returning to my conclusion that we have little advanced theory, the implications of this 
discussion of what we claim general theory to be should be obvious.  Theoretical formulations 
that meet even a handful of the preceding criteria are rare in our discipline.  Consider again my 
poster-theory examples.  Despite near-universal agreement on the value of the SES theory of 
voting in terms of its explanatory power and parsimony, no formal statement of it exists.  
Further, in my view, several interesting implications of that “standard model” have also therefore 
been ignored or under-appreciated.  And the formulation that appears to be the leading 
alternative effort to account for mass participation in the United States – Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady’s (1995) Civic Volunteerism model – has not been formally stated and would appear not 
to be parsimonious, elegant, or particularly nomothetic (although absent a formal statement of 
the theory, the latter characterizations are perhaps speculative). 
CPG theory has also never been dressed in the full, precisely specified armament of a 
general theory that is outlined above.  Much of the work of its leading advocates explicates 
selective aspects of the theory, such as its assumptions about the electoral roots of legislative 
behavior and those about how variations in the level of conditional party government lead to 
different structural decisions and rules in the parties in office (e.g., Aldrich and Rohde 2001, 
2009).   Aldrich (2011, esp. 225-254) offers the most comprehensive account of the theory in 
print, but considerable detail there on related lines of research and much descriptive, historical 
information on the House of Representatives meant to illustrate implications of the theory 
complicate the exposition of the theory.  The absence of a systematic statement of the complete 
theory has also allowed other commentators to describe its core assumptions and expectations in 
different ways (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 2005, 210-214; Krehbiel 1998, 165-172; Smith and 
Gamm 2005). 
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The fundamental concepts and assumptions of selectorate theory, in contrast, have been 
carefully stated in Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003), who also provide 
formal modeling to explicate its logic.  Numerous empirical tests have also been advanced that 
offer evidence for verification of the theory.  Yet its authors acknowledge that, “it remains a 
primitive theory in need of enrichment with more institutional details and improved 
measurement” (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003, 11-12).  The theory 
appears most in need of improved measures of central concepts for verification tests and 
attention to its explanatory power relative to rival theory.  
Although this is not an example to be explicated in detail here some of my own research 
could be evaluated in the same critical terms as are applied to the three formulations above.  
Patricia Hurley and I have proposed a general theory of legislative representation, outlined its 
key components, and provided a range of verifying evidence for it (Hurley and Hill 2003).  Yet 
the theory was not fully articulated in that work, and the scope of the empirical evidence was 
limited.  There is work in progress, however, to remedy these deficiencies. 
 
A Kuhnian or Lakatosian Perspective on Theory in Political Science 
A second way to explain how it is the case that theory development is limited in our 
discipline is to draw upon some little-appreciated observations about the evolution of theory in 
Kuhn and Lakatos.  Recall Kuhn’s (1996, 10-11) catch-all concept of scientific paradigms, 
which bind communities of scholars around common theoretical perspectives and research 
agendas and which most working scientists likely think about in some fully realized state.  Yet 
Kuhn (1996, 23) observes that newly created paradigms are typically “very limited in both scope 
and precision.”  He goes on to articulate how some paradigms may enjoy further elaboration 
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because of continuing work by scholars in the relevant community.   Lakatos (1978, 47) employs 
the concept of research programmes, to characterize much of what Kuhn does as paradigms.  
Lakatos (1978, 48-51) also observes that some research programmes flourish because their 
adherents work systematically to extend them whereas others languish because of a lack of 
systematic developmental research.  It is important not to reify these concepts of scientific 
paradigms and research programmes, the first of which even Kuhn (196, 174-210) admits to be 
vague.  But they give us analytic perspective on individual bodies of scholarship and theory in 
political science. 
Most “theories” in political science reflect the relatively underdeveloped state of young 
scientific paradigms or research programmes as Kuhn and Lakatos describe them.  And this 
circumstance has important implications.  Too often our theories are vaguely stated and 
articulated.  Absent an explicit verbal articulation, a given theory is really many different 
theories as it is interpreted and employed by different scholars.  And when a theory is not 
precisely identified, there is much doubt about whether and how the accumulating record of 
empirical findings implies confirmation, disconfirmation, or implications for revision.  As the 
physics Nobel-laureate Richard Feynman (1965, 158) observed, “you cannot prove a vague 
theory wrong.” 
 
Characterizing the Bulk of Our Theory as of the “Middle Range,” Or Worse 
 
 I have long been attracted to Robert Merton’s characterization of middle range theory, in 
part for want of a better label and in part because it comports well with the vast bulk of good 
scientific practice in the search for advanced theory.  The intellectual progression of even highly 
advanced sciences like physics has been largely by way of the creation of middle range theories 
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that were eventually incorporated into more general formulations (Weinberg 2001, 187-206).   
Merton (1949, 5) elaborates his conception of such theory in the following useful way as, 
“logically interconnected conceptions which are limited and modest in scope, rather than all-
embracing and grandiose.”  At other points he explains that he has in mind theories meant to 
account for individual and sometimes narrow topics (e.g., Merton 1949, 9).   This 
characterization likely resonates with the majority of working political scientists but in so 
commonplace a way as to suggest that the label has little merit or interest.  I attach much 
significance, however, to how it applies to our discipline.  In all the fields I know best it appears 
that one can at most say that we have some weak approximation of middle range theory (or of 
competing middle range theories) and that we have been at that plateau for a considerable period 
of time. 
 Consider, then, Merton’s characterization of a middle range theory as a means for 
summarizing this argument about our progress in political science.  The first point in this 
argument is that we have numerous attempts in political science to create something like middle 
range theoretical accounts of the kinds of phenomena Merton believes to be the proper subjects 
of such theory.   The second implication of this discussion is that we have, at best, mostly only 
weak approximations of good middle range theory.  When our efforts at theory construction 
produce vaguely stated, incompletely articulated formulations, or ones for which validation 
efforts have been relatively unsystematic, they are not particularly useful guides for research that 
might lead to more general ones.  There may be some shared agreement within scholars working 
under a given paradigm or line of theory about key assumptions, concepts, and propositions.  But 
the diffuseness of most of these paradigms means that there is as much ambiguity as 
concreteness in these shared agreements.    
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My concerns here are not unique either.  Various other scholars have observed 
comparable problems in our discipline as a whole or in their sub-fields.  I cite a few example 
observations of this sort, each with its own particular focus, but in some important way each 
echoing part of the argument above.  Achen (2002, 445) argues that our discipline generally has 
a “proliferation of noncumulative studies” in good part because too little of our research is based 
on a rigorously constructed theoretical foundation. Bartels (2010, 252-253) observes that, in the 
face of conflicting evidence on how to account for fundamental aspects of mass electoral 
behavior, most scholars in that field have taken up the pursuit of relatively limited questions 
instead of general theory.  Brecher (1999, 217) cites the “low value placed by most IR scholars 
on the cumulation of knowledge” [emphasis in the original].   
Edwards (2009) argues that much research on presidential leadership of the U.S. 
Congress is compromised by poor theoretical foundations.  Geddes (2007) concludes that after 
some 60 years of vigorous research, the causes of the democratization of national governments 
are disputed and that there is no consensus on a theory that would account for democratization.  
Sinclair (2010) and Smith (2007, 213-214) independently conclude that we have no theoretical 
account of the role of political parties in the U.S. Senate, and after much intellectual firepower 
has been expended in an effort to construct one.   Indeed, Smith (2007, 114-147) raises concerns 
about both the CPG and cartel theories of lawmaking that are in the spirit of the remarks in this 
essay – that both theories require further elaboration and verification. 
 
The Many Goals of Science, or Theory Isn’t Everything But Everything Else Depends on It 
 I pause in the “long line” of the argument here to address an objection that could have 
arisen in the minds of some readers by this point.  The preceding comments accord a high place 
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to the pursuit of basic science theory.  But some might argue, and quite correctly, that science 
has many goals and that individual scientists may thus have many different professional 
ambitions.  Do I postulate an unfair or unreasonable position for basic science?  Consider, 
however, our other major activities and their relation to basic science. 
 The most common alternative activity in our profession in my estimation is the pursuit of 
applied policy research on particular topics that also leads to advice to policymakers and to those 
who would influence policymaking.  Such efforts have a noble place in our discipline, going 
back at least to the seminal call for such efforts by Lasswell (1951) early in the modern life of 
our discipline.  Indeed, lay people as well as many political scientists often assume this is the 
principal function of science. 
 Closely related to explicit policy research are the efforts of many in our discipline to 
advise the mass public and government policy makers in more general ways about policy 
choices.  Various activities fall under this heading, including among others, efforts to craft a 
position as a “public intellectual” (Hauck 2010) and engagement with the mass media as a 
commentator on a variety of political affairs.  Some might label these efforts educative, others 
might call them advocacy, with either a positive or critical implication implied.   
 A third common activity is puzzle solving.  Here I have in mind efforts to account for 
discrete, notable events by the application of political science knowledge.  We do not have a 
body of work that formally outlines the character of such research or how it might most 
profitably proceed (but see Grofman 2001).  But such research appears even in our leading 
journals with considerable regularity, on topics such as why the Republican party took control of 
the U.S. House of Representatives in 2010 (or in 1994, for those who recall the spate of articles 
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on that event), why the Soviet Union collapsed, and which presidential candidate actually 
received the most valid votes in 2000 in its disputed vote and subsequent recount episode.   
 Applied research, more general attempts to influence public policy debate, and puzzle 
solving are important functions of any science for which they are possible.  But the quality of all 
these efforts is dependent on the quality of our basic science knowledge. David Easton in 
Framework (1965, 7) made this same observation succinctly and almost half a century ago for 
our profession, “The application of knowledge is as much a part of the scientific enterprise as 
theoretical understanding.  But the understanding and explanation of political behavior logically 
precede and provide the basis for efforts to utilize political knowledge in the solution of urgent 
practical problems of society.” 
 Scientists often engage in at least one other role that I discuss separately for its distinctive 
relation to theory and for its distinctive historical position in the development of our science.  
Some political scientists engage relatively exclusively or occasionally in data collection efforts, 
or one could say in description and observation.  And this activity is as important for our 
discipline today as it was in past times.  Survey research data sets, events data sets of various 
types, and collections of other social, economic, and governmental data are common in every 
sub-field of the discipline.  Such data collections have contributed substantially to the collective 
research enterprise.  Data collection, however, stands in an interdependent relationship with 
theory construction rather than in a dependent one.  Relevant data of high quality are essential to 
theory construction, but theory is essential for directing the collection of data and in imbuing 
data once collected with meaning, again as Easton (1953, 52-63) likely first observed in political 
science.  Numerous contemporary political scientists, of course, have repeated this observation 
(although it is not clear that much of the theory testing research that I read considers the 
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observation deliberately).   Thus the quality and utility of data collection, too, are in part 
dependent on the state of our theory. 
 
The Evolution of Scientific Knowledge 
 If most lines of scholarship in political science are at some modest level of middle-range 
theory, how did they get there?  Can one demonstrate that intellectual progress was made in the 
course of that development?  How do sciences generally evolve in these terms?  Answers to 
these questions can be valuable for many purposes.  I sketch answers to them here as part of my 
intention to describe our state of intellectual progress and how we might advance  beyond it. 
 A reading of the history of a variety of scientific disciplines suggests one can objectively 
identify four stages of evolution for those disciplines that have developed relatively 
autonomously.  In classroom expositions I use astronomy as one example, because that discipline 
has evolved through all the stages and offers rich evidence for all of them.  Yet political science 
itself is a good example and will be used here for that purpose. 
 These stages can be objectively distinguished by their most common research activities, 
yet they overlap to a degree in practice, even in single research paradigms or programs, and for 
good and ill reasons.  They overlap in part because activities in earlier stages remain important in 
later ones, although they become subordinate to the modal activity in each succeeding stage (Hill 
and Leighley 2005, 347-350).   I label the first stage as one of uncontrolled observation and 
description.  Kuhn (1996, 15) observes of this stage that “early fact-gathering is a far more 
nearly random activity than the one that subsequent scientific development makes familiar.”  He 
also aptly characterizes the work in this first stage as being based on “casual observation and 
experiment.”  The early period of modern, professional political science – from approximately 
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1890 to 1950 or 1960 as most authors date it –  is described in much the same terms by Deutsch 
(1973, 2-6), Easton (1953, 37-52), Freeman (1991, 16-17), and Lasswell (1942, 25-30), among 
others.   
 Somewhere along the timeline of scholarship, the principal research focus shifts to the 
second stage of hypothesis formation and testing.  In subfields of political science I know best 
this second stage ran from approximately 1950 to 1970, which also fits Deutsch’s (1973, 7-11) 
general assessment of when this transition occurred for our entire discipline.  As its label 
suggests, putative tests of causal connections become the primary focus of research in this stage, 
but one also observes here more scholars than in the previous stage struggling with efforts to 
improve conceptualization, data collection, and hypothesis testing.  Yet Deutsch (1973, 10-11) 
correctly characterizes this work in political science as yielding “an accumulation of what J. 
David Singer has called the ‘correlational knowledge’ of which variables appeared correlated 
and how strongly and how significantly with what types of outcomes, and under what 
conditions.”  The best work in the second stage also explored multivariate analyses, although it is 
striking how common bivariate analysis was, even at the front rank. 
 During the early 1970s or perhaps a decade later, many subfields in political science saw 
the appearance of their first, if simple, middle range theories, the third stage of evolution.   In 
this period, as one example, the SES model of mass political behavior was codified. Competing 
theoretical formulations with a rational choice foundation such as that of Downs (1957) became 
relatively well realized somewhat later, because empirical work on them lagged that on the SES 
model.  In the study of legislative representation in the United States, for another example, 
Kuklinski’s (e.g., 1977) several studies of California legislators apparently effectively formalized 
what I call the “standard model” of instructed delegate representation that has dominated that 
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research field to the present – although one could mis-read Miller and Stokes (1963), as many 
have, to be the precedent here.2  
In this third stage, then, we begin to see bodies of scholarship that adopt relatively 
common assumptions, concepts, hypotheses, and measures that imply an underlying theoretical 
foundation.  As Kuhn (1996, 23) characterized such developments generally, however, this event 
often arises with “very limited…scope and precision.”  Some, and perhaps many, scholars who 
work in a particular paradigmatic line of research may not even recognize the implicit 
assumptions of the paradigm.  This problem could account in part for criticisms of the “Michigan 
model” for focusing too much on individual level attributes as causes of mass political behavior 
and too little on the social context influences that were especially of concern to the  “Columbia 
School” perspective that preceded it.  Equally, it is a part of the criticism of so-called behavioral 
research generally by students of the “new institutionalism” (e.g., March and Olson 1984).    
Some students of legislative representation adopt instructed delegate theory for their research 
without a conscious recognition that they do so.  Thus the assumptions of and possible bounds of 
applicability for many middle range theories may not be well understood – or explored – by 
many scholars who employ them. 
                                                 
2This standard model assumes that only instructed delegate representation exists or is to be 
modeled, includes as standard explanatory variables a measure of constituency ideology or 
preferences and a measure of the partisan affiliation of the legislators.  The dependent variable is 
one or another measure of legislators’ roll-call voting.  Additional explanatory variables are 
added to this basic model in accord with whatever original hypotheses a given scholar wishes to 
test using the basic formulation as his or her theoretical platform. 
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 The most advanced scientific disciplines, of course, have experienced one or more 
general theories, the fourth stage of evolution.  Astronomy is a wonderful classroom example for 
this reason, too, for its several successive general theories exhibit especially well how knowledge 
advances and how newer theories both incorporate the knowledge in and go beyond that of older 
ones.  While I conclude that CPG theory is still in the middle-range stage of development, 
Aldrich and Rohde (2001) argue that it demonstrates this kind of progress – accounting for the 
same legislative behavior that Mayhew’s (1974) – also middle range – theory does, but going 
further to explain behavior that Mayhew cannot. 
One might conclude of political science that we have some “candidate” general theories, 
but it does not appear there is consensus in the relevant subfields of scholarship that the 
descriptor of candidate should yet be removed from them.  At the same time, those subfields of 
political science with such advanced theories demonstrate especially notable intellectual 
progress. 
 The preceding observations evoke a question raised earlier:  how can one demonstrate 
intellectual progress, and especially in political science?  We can point to the creation of specific, 
even modestly developed theories as one important kind of evidence.  But there is an additional 
way that I think to be very enlightening (for a third approach, see Deutsch, Markovits, and Platt 
1986).  Reading most journal articles from the 1950s and even the succeeding few decades in 
those fields where I toil as a researcher leaves me struck by how relatively primitive most of that 
work is in conceptualization, data collection, and hypothesis testing.  Another remarkable 
deficiency of much older scholarship is how ill-explained its scientific procedures are.  The idea 
that such procedures should be public was recognized, but essential details of data collection, 
measurement and estimation are often absent in much published work from the 1950s and even 
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1960s.  Scholars still today, of course, debate the best definition of and measure for many 
fundamental concepts, and they argue still over optimal theory testing methods.  But reading old 
literature is both a sobering and yet encouraging experience.  We know much more today than in 
the past about the majority of topics we study.  Our present knowledge may be less systematic 
than this essay argues is desirable and possible, but it is generally an advance over that of the 
past in other respects. 
 We should also recognize that our contemporary debates about concepts, measures, 
methods, and the like are not necessarily a sign of intellectual weakness.  Weinberg relates how 
Einstein’s theory of relativity threw into doubt for a time the meaning of the seemingly prosaic 
and fundamental concept of mass in physics, which was already a quite advanced science.  But 
Weinberg’s (2001, 194) conclusion about how that episode was resolved is also instructive, 
“Meanings [of concepts] can change, but generally they do so in the direction of an increased 
richness and precision of definition.”   
 
Failings of Pedagogy 
 Three observations suggest that the way we educate young scholars often limits their 
abilities to contribute meaningfully to theoretical advancement.  The first observation comes 
from extensive study of graduate course syllabi – from a random selection of U.S. News & World 
Report “top twenty” Ph.D. departments.  In that effort I uncovered some syllabi for what appear 
to be exemplary courses that introduce students systematically to both the substance and the 
leading theories of their fields.  Such courses, however, appear to be in the minority.   A high 
percentage of courses on substantive topics offer instead “topics on parade,” with select and 
usually few readings per topic, all marching quickly by (the phrase in parentheses here is a 
25 
 
characterization of undergraduate American politics survey courses from a paper published long 
ago in PS:  Political Science & Politics and whose clever author I do not recall).  Admittedly, 
there might be lecture content in some of these courses that provides theoretical connective tissue 
to undergird these topics.  Yet rare was the syllabus of this sort that suggested the existence of 
that undergirding.  In such courses, then, I suspect that the extant body of competing theory is 
not systematically taught.  Indeed, the word theory in the title of a course does not seem to 
guarantee that there will be much of that in its content. 
 The preceding observation and evidence might be discounted as not reflecting the corpus 
of any particular doctoral student’s education.  Perhaps the accumulated product of coursework, 
independent study, and mentoring by one’s faculty overcomes the deficiencies in individual 
courses.  A second observation, however, suggests that this is not necessarily the case.   My 
department has had very many junior faculty searches over the last decade or so, and thus we 
have seen doctoral research presentations by very many young Ph.D.’s or ABD’s.   I also review 
a notable number of journal manuscript submissions, presumably from scholars of all ranks, and 
on a range of related topics.   
 Many young scholars we interview for faculty positions do not evidence an 
understanding of major theories in their field, cannot relate their own research to one of those 
theories, and have difficulty even discussing these matters in a meaningful way.  Equally, it is 
remarkable how many journal article manuscripts I review cite scholarship only published within 
the last five or ten years, cite odd works to substantiate notable research findings for which there 
are other, seminal citations, and cite many seminal works incorrectly.  As one elaboration of the 
latter observation for the study of legislative representation, Hurley and Hill (2010, 716) observe 
that the seminal article by Miller and Stokes in that literature “is one of the most cited, if not one 
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of the most carefully read, publications in political science.”  Even more to the critical point, I 
referee many papers for journals that do not know the frontier of knowledge and whose authors 
don’t recognize where their work might fit in the larger body of extant scholarship seen as a 
collective whole.  Of course, such work is rarely at or near the frontier. 
 A third observation concerns how many young scholars are allowed or encouraged to 
create their research agendas with little regard for the frontier of theoretical knowledge.  We 
have a widespread custom of allowing graduate students to follow their personal, undirected 
curiosity to a research topic for their dissertation – and for other parts of their research agenda.  I 
style this practice to my students as research on my favorite city, my favorite nation, or my 
favorite and surely neglected independent variable – regardless of its relevance to the frontier of 
theoretical knowledge.  Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1948, viii) lamented this practice, too, 
at the dawn of the modern age of social science.  One has to wonder how far we have advanced 
in this respect since that time. 
 Many young scholars who have interviewed for faculty positions at my institution, 
however, claim to be testing a theory – and usually one of their own ad hoc construction – for 
their personally chosen topic.  Yet when they are pressed to elaborate that theory, it often turns 
out to consist of only one or two hypotheses whose conceptual foundation is weak or ill thought 
out.  This observation suggests that the teaching of what theory is, what the typical structure of a 
theory might or should be, and how one might test theory is commonly as fragmentary as my 
dissection of sample doctoral course syllabi also suggests.   
 This catholic posture about topics for doctoral research in graduate education also 
contributes to the construction of eclectic research programs that may provide, in the best cases, 
interesting, particularistic findings on some topics but that rarely move the theoretical frontier.    
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In contrast, it appears that only a minority – although perhaps the intellectually strongest 
minority – of scholars follow the path of programmatic research that is so vividly advocated by 
Aronson, Wilson, and Brewer (1998, 133-134) for experimental research.  Aronson, et al.’s 
advice translated into a general research philosophy would be, first, that no single research study 
can provide adequate evidence for the test of an individual hypothesis or theory.  Instead, we 
should pursue multiple tests of our theoretical propositions, ideally and as possible, with multiple 
methods that differ as much as possible from each other.  And we should seek to test what many 
have referred to as multiple implications of theory.  This philosophy, then, directs us to follow a 
logically ordered and systematic program of research as the optimal route to the discovery and 
verification of theory.  This path also seems the most profitable one for making meaningful 
contributions to substantive or theoretical knowledge, yet it appears to be the research path of but 
a minority of the members of our discipline. 
 The several observations here, taken together, have cumulative implications for the 
advancement of theory.  If many scholars are not well grounded in extant theory in their field, 
the principal works that establish the major lines of theory, and the body of work attempting to 
advance individual lines of theory, then they are ill-prepared either to do the latter kind of 
research themselves or to educate future generations of scholars to do so.  Literally broad 
knowledge about relevant theory seems important, too, in order to have a vision of what new 
research might most meaningfully contribute to theoretical advances.  The latter thought evokes 
Charles Rosen’s characterization of how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven created a new style of 
music, the “classical style,” which many of their peers failed to recognize or grasp.   Rosen’s 
remarks on this topic could just as well apply to a new theoretical advance in science with but a 
few changes of nouns.   One of his comments in the discussion of this topic contrasts the new 
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classical style with the compositions of “the mass of minor composers, many of them very fine, 
who understood only imperfectly the direction in which they were going, holding on to habits of 
the past which no longer made compete sense in the new musical context, experimenting with 
ideas they had not quite the power to render coherent” (Rosen 1997, 22).   If we educate young 
scholars well, and indeed ourselves too, in extant theory, our scientific discipline will not merit a 
comparable characterization.  Every scholar would then be prepared both to teach and to research 
efficaciously in one or another middle range “style” of theory. 
 I am persuaded, too, that broad knowledge of extant theory is especially important for 
creative scholarship that might notably advance the theoretical frontier.  We do not teach about 
the creative process in science, and the standard observation, widely made, is that both 
philosophy of science and the teaching of scientific practice focus on how we attempt to verify 
knowledge but not on how we generate insights of a substantive or theoretical sort for 
verification.   Kaplan (1964, 13-180), as one example, refers to these concerns as relating to the 
“context of discovery” and the “context of justification.”  Yet a thorough knowledge of the 
character and bounds of contemporary theory may be essential for insights about how to advance 
such theory in a major way.   Even serendipitous findings may only have deep meaning for those 
with broad knowledge of the relevant field, as suggested by Pasteur’s observation that “In the 
field of observation, chance favors only the prepared mind” (Beveridge 1980, 33). 
 
Research Routines to Advance General Theory 
 It would seem a formidable goal to reach the intellectual plateau of general theory in any 
science.  Doubtless, it is a rare achievement we often associate with the work of single, 
presumably brilliant individuals.  I argue, however, that the latter perception about how rare such 
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achievements are may not be entirely accurate, that the task is as much a collective as individual 
one, and that there are deliberate research routines that can help us reach this goal.   
 There does not appear to be much systematic advice in our discipline, however, about 
how to do this.  Absent such advice, I offer six maxims about how we might shape our research 
practices to be more successful.  The first maxim is that for some subfields of political science the 
road to general theory is likely shorter than the customary view of that goal would imply.  Many 
sub-fields of political science have already gone some distance toward such theory.  While we 
may have many ill-developed theoretical paradigms, they are sensible starting points.  They 
imply some consensus on fundamental assumptions, critical concepts, and at least some 
propositions that link concepts causally.  Formalizing these fragments into a systematically 
stated whole is far less challenging than starting the process de novo.  And more systematic 
statements of such theory could direct the search for verification along especially efficacious 
paths.  But I mean here, of course, literally systematic efforts both at the formalization and the 
verification of theory. 
 The second maxim is that successful theory construction must depend on a balance of 
inductive and deductive reasoning.  I offer this maxim precisely because of an intellectual divide 
on this matter in our discipline.  Many political scientists conclude that the optimal route to 
theory would be based on a foundation of “formal” or deductive theorizing (for a careful 
statement of this view see Morton 1999, 3-24).  At another “philosophy of science” pole from the 
deductive theory camp is an even larger number of scholars who appear to believe that the 
simple accumulation of more and more inductively derived evidence about relations among 
prominent variables will somehow add up to one day suggest general theory.   
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My perspective is different, although it is at the foundation of many discussions of the 
scientific method.  Many textbook as well as more advanced discussions recognize that both 
inductive and deductive reasoning are essential for the task of theory construction, and in more 
than just a superficial way.  We do not have at hand histories of how some of our most prominent 
middle range theoretical formulations came about, but my suspicion is that some were the work 
of scholars whose initial thinking was highly inductive and others were the work of scholars who 
begin with relatively deductive conceptualizations.  Neither route – as a starting point – seems 
privileged in any science.  Yet both must play a notable role in successful theory construction.  
Einstein’s explication of the scientific method, presented in Holton (1986, 28-56), is especially 
insightful about the critical value of both inductive and deductive thought. 
My third maxim is that theory must trump, or lead, methods.  This maxim is also 
motivated by a widely held view that especially advanced statistical methods will most help us 
advance theory in our discipline.  I can cite no explicit statement to that effect, but the 
philosophy appears widespread and is reflected in the doctoral education programs of many 
Ph.D. granting departments.  Such methods are important and valuable, and they reflect the 
tendency in all sciences to become more mathematically sophisticated over time.  Yet common, 
advanced statistical methods have recently come under scrutiny in our field.  Recall how, as cited 
earlier, Achen (2002) and Brady (2008) have raised doubts about the value of many of our 
advanced methods for making sound causal inferences and thus verifying theoretical 
formulations.  Achen (2011) has even observed that virtually all the most important discoveries 
in political science were the product of cross-tabular analysis.  My addition is that 
methodological concerns instead of literally theoretical ones appear to motivate a high 
percentage of the unpublished and published papers that I read.  Like inductive and deductive 
31 
 
reasoning, theory and methods somehow have to be balanced for successful research.  Yet in this 
case the balance is not one of equality but of theory dictating optimal methods.  This is a 
conventional textbook dictum, yet it seems often ignored in our discipline. 
A fourth maxim is that we should practice what we should preach (teach).  That is, some 
of the advice offered above for doctoral education should also be embraced by scholars 
generally.  One key strategy there is programmatic research on notable lines of middle range 
theory.  This advice, however, has parts that are as important as the whole.  One part is that we 
should especially embrace notable, extant lines of theory instead of crafting ad hoc (and usually 
far more fragmentary) theoretical foundations for our scholarship.  The other part is that we 
attack the construction and validation of theory systematically – through a series of analyses that 
rely on multiple tests and multiple measures and that assemble a substantial body of evidence 
about causal effects and processes. 
Relatedly, we should incorporate replication tests in the latter kinds of research in a 
systematic way.   Conventional advice about the value of replication typically inspires little 
enthusiasm – and for good reason, since it is not imaginative.  “Mere replication” is also widely 
thought to have modest prospects for publication, and thus it is undervalued.  Our goal, however, 
should be to build replication tests into individual journal articles and books – with multiple tests 
of critical propositions with alternative samples, measures, and time periods.  We must learn to 
design parsimonious research reports that incorporate multiple replication tests or tests of 
multiple implications of theory.  There are examples, too, of such work.  Consider how Patricia 
Hurley and I have presented evidence in a single journal article for fundamental propositions for 
our theory of legislative representation with multiple tests at multiple time periods, and thus with 
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multiple, alternative measures of key concepts, for members of both the U.S. Senate and House 
of Representatives (Hurley and Hill 2003). 
My fifth maxim is that we should not dismiss the textbook literature on theory 
construction.  One could worry that such works are trivial “cookbook” treatments.  Yet I see 
various kinds of value in such explications as those of Kaplan (1964, esp. 294-326), Jaccard and 
Jacoby (2010), and Lave and March (1975), among others.  Intellectual chestnuts such as Platt’s 
(1964) paper on methods of “strong inference” are also relevant here.  Such works may not plot 
the route to theory with certainty.  Yet they might help inspire one or another part of Pasteur’s 
“prepared mind.” 
My sixth maxim is that we should ignore the real world, or at least much of the 
information it presents to us, more often than we do.  This advice wants careful parsing.  We 
must rely on evidence from the real world, faithfully acquired and represented, as one foundation 
for both theory construction and verification.  But preoccupation with the real world can lead us 
astray from the task of theory construction, and in two ways.  First, and as discussed above, very 
much research in our discipline is concerned with explaining particular puzzles that often have 
no clearly explicated theoretical implications or for which theory is not employed to tackle the 
puzzle.  The everyday world of politics is doubtless fascinating, at times uplifting, at times 
frustrating, and frequently puzzling.  Many political scientists are driven by curiosity and by a 
sense of a professional role to account for notable happenings there.  But at times preoccupation 
with everyday politics distracts from our other professional role as scientists in search of basic 
knowledge. 
Second, even when our avowed goal is theory construction, we are presented with an 
abundance of particularistic evidence from the observable world on virtually every important 
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political phenomenon.  Yet often we fail to abstract from that evidence only its essential parts 
that are necessary for general theory.  Too often political scientists adopt a view of their subject 
matter that is reflected in the comment by Dahl (2004, 377) that “politics is a subject of 
exceptional complexity.”  But even physical scientists who have been successful in theory 
construction underscore how the same view of complexity could be adopted for their research 
subject matter, but must be transcended.    
Einstein described the natural world as presenting us with a “labyrinth of sense 
impressions” and then went on to say that “Science is the attempt to make the chaotic diversity 
of our sense-experience correspond to a logically uniform system of thought” (Holton 1986, 32).   
Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun (1998, 11) discuss how early twentieth century research on the 
human brain assumed that one must account for how all the billions of neurons in the brain 
interact to explain its functioning.  Then they observe how successful accounts for brain 
functions were based on more abstract conceptions, “to think that we need to know the actions of 
all [neurons] to figure out how the brain works would be preposterous…. Advances are made by 
working at different levels of organization.  By knowing what behavior is actually produced, we 
need not know all the possible interactions that occur with underlying elements.  In this manner a 
problem becomes constrained and solvable.” King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 9-10) offer useful 
advice, too, that, “what we perceive as complexity is not entirely inherent in phenomena…. the 
perceived complexity of a situation depends in part on how well we can simplify reality.” 
There are at least three interconnected points at which we must both recognize and 
embrace abstraction from particulars.  First, in the construction and measurement of individual 
concepts that are central to a theory we must recognize that, as Kerlinger (1986, 29) observes, 
“operational definitions yield only limited meanings of constructs.  No operational definition can 
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ever express the rich and diverse aspects of human prejudice, for example.”  That is, concepts are 
rich in literal conceptual content, whereas operational measures capture, or abstract out, only a 
part of that richness.    
The preceding observation is widely made in relevant methodological literature, but its 
implications for the creation of working measures of concepts is often ignored or even resisted in 
political science.  An example of this circumstance is the pursuit of measures of notable concepts 
with high particularistic content (e.g., Coppedge and Geering 2011).  Yet the quality of 
operational measures is best ensured by theoretically focused content validation in the 
conceptualization of the theory (and especially for latent concepts) supplemented with extensive 
construct validation tests in the effort to validate the theory.  Construct evaluation effectively 
adopts the assumptions of a given theory and the constitutive and operational definitions of its 
theoretically embedded measures.  Strong empirical evidence for the theory, and especially for 
its explanatory power, is also strong evidence for the validity of the measures of its concepts.   
Thus the evaluation of rival theories is in part an evaluation of rival measures, and the evaluation 
of measures of concepts is best made by this theory laden process.  Thus parsimony and 
abstraction are goals for both measurement and theory construction.  
Second, whole theories – ordered systems of expected relations among assumptions and 
concepts – are necessarily significant abstractions from the particulars of the natural world.  In 
the social sciences one version of this position was first stated effectively by Friedman (1953, 
30-39):  that assumptions of theories need not be “realistic” to be useful.   His argument has been 
especially adopted in defense of rational choice models in political science (e.g., Moe 1978, 221-
226).  Yet the more general position here about abstraction is echoed by numerous physical 
scientists.   Indeed, this is the ultimate point of the quotations above from Einstein and from 
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Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun about the power of science to make sense of complex empirical 
phenomena.  A related point, widely made in discussions of scientific theories, is that they 
should be abstract because they aim to be explanations of both what is known and what is 
unknown about a related set of phenomena (e.g., Holton and Brush 1985, 31; Kerlinger 1986, 30-
32).   Thus general theories of political phenomena will likely be highly abstract, too, but this is 
in the nature of the intellectual construction that theory is. 
Finally, the verification of theories is also a process that lacks the kind of particularism 
with which some political scientists are most comfortable – and as a product of the preceding 
two points.  As Leege and Francis (1974, 42) observe, “We never actually test our substantive 
theory.  Rather, through empirical operations we test a ‘test theory.’  We test a posited 
relationship between sets of indicators which we feel exemplify each concept.”  This observation 
might instill in some uneasiness with the general process of verification. Yet if we build the kind 
of body of evidence for a particular theory that is called for in various ways in this essay, we 
reduce the skepticism about it that we might otherwise have for this and many other reasons. 
Further, verification tests of individual hypotheses that might have larger theoretical 
implications are often jeopardized in another particular way – by a perversion of the principle of 
testing for spuriousness by taking account of “plausible rival hypotheses.” The latter principle 
was first especially well explicated by Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and Sechrest (1966, 10), but 
it has been reiterated by many others down through time (e.g., King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 
32-33).  Yet in many verification tests the principle is often bastardized into one of controlling 
for any even flimsily plausible hypotheses.  Achen (2002, 441-449), in particular, has explicated 
the riskiness of this research strategy for causal inference.  Thus theoretically directed parsimony 
and abstraction are essential for verification tests in this second way, as well. 
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Conclusion 
 The descriptive, critical, and prescriptive arguments above are sufficiently 
straightforward that they do not require summary or elaboration.  Some reflection on the 
intellectual philosophy behind them, however, would be valuable.  Science has many goals, all of 
which are meritorious.   Individual scientists are motivated by their personal curiosity and 
ambitions, as well, to pursue one or several of those separate goals.  Yet it is virtually universally 
recognized that general theory is the highest strictly intellectual goal.  I reference Easton (1953, 
4), who stated over half a century ago that “All mature scientific knowledge is theoretical,” as a 
reminder of how venerable this observation is in our own profession.     
 The most successful scientific disciplines owe their success in good part to the work of 
scholars who were inspired by the preceding observation.  They were driven to succeed at theory 
construction because it is the most challenging and exalted goal.  The intention of this essay is to 
inspire more political scientists to have the same ambition – and to consider deliberately how 
best to realize it.  
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